New Yorker piece by Seymour Hersh, we get a timeline of events surrounding the North Korean nuclear weapons programs - and the Pakistani connection. Unfortunately, we are not told when the Bush (or Clinton) administration first knew what. All we learn is that there was a CIA report issued in June of 2002 that listed North Korean activities that began in 1997. However, there is a case that can be made that when things started to break down in 2002, the administration didn't handle the situation well.
Once again, we found that presenting the material in a table format helps understand the relationship between the events and the actors.
| when | who | what |
| 1980's | Pakistan | - nuclear program flourished
- military and intelligence forces were working closely with the U.S. to repel Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
|
| 1985 | North Korea | - signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
- opened of most of its nuclear sites to international inspection
|
| early 1990's | American intelligence
and
international inspectors | - North Koreans were reprocessing more spent fuel than they had declared
- Might have separated enough plutonium to fabricate one or two nuclear weapons
|
| 1994 | North Korea | Entered into an agreement with the Clinton Administration: - Stop the nuclear-weapons program.
- Obtain economic aid and the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors
|
| 1994 | North Korea | Unknown if it had begun to build warheads |
| |
| 1997 | North Korea | Trying to produce weapons-grade uranium from natural uranium-with Pakistani technology |
1997
and later | Pakistan
to
North Korea(As outlined in CIA
report below. Unclear
when U.S. intelligence
first knew about these
activities.) | - Economy had foundered
- "No more money" to pay for North Korean missile support
- Paid for missile systems in part by sharing its nuclear-weapons secrets
- Provided data on how to build and test a uranium-triggered nuclear weapon
- Helped North Korea conduct a series of "cold tests," simulated nuclear explosions, using natural uranium, which are necessary to determine whether a nuclear device will detonate properlyGave the North Korean intelligence service advice on from American satellites and U.S. and South Korean intelligence agents.
- Centrifuges:
- Sent prototypes of high-speed centrifuge machines
- "Chopped many years off" the North Korean development process
- With a few thousand centrifuges, could have enough fissile material to manufacture two or three warheads a year
- Pakistani centrifuges:
- Slim cylinders, roughly six feet in height, that could be shipped "by the hundreds"
|
| | A. Q. Khan
Director of a Pakistani weapons-research lab | At least thirteen visits to North Korea |
| |
| 2001 | North Korea | Began to enrich uranium in significant quantities |
| | Pakistan | There are close ties between some scientists working for the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and radical Islamic groups |
| ~25 Sep 2001 | Bush | Lifted the sanctions that had been imposed on Pakistan because of its nuclear-weapons activities |
| Jan 2002 | John Bolton
Under-Sec. of State for Arms Control | Declared that North Korea had a covert nuclear-weapons program and was in violation of the nonproliferation treaty |
| Feb 2002 | 3 members of Congress | Urged Bush to withhold support for the two reactors promised to North Korea |
| May 2002 | John Bolton | Accused North Korea of failing to coöperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency |
| Jun 2002 | CIA report: National
Intellegence
Estimate | - Separate and contradictory estimates from C.I.A., the Pentagon, the State Department, and the Department of Energy regarding the number of warheads that North Korea might have been capable of making
- Provided no consensus on whether or not the Pyongyang regime is actually producing them
- Predicted that North Korea, if confronted with the evidence of unanium-enrichment program:
- Would not risk an open break with the 1994 agreement
- Would do nothing to violate the nonproliferation treaty
|
| 5 Jul 2002 | Condoleezza Rice | Letter to the congressmen: Bush Administration would continue providing North Korea with: - Shipments of heavy fuel oil
- Nuclear technology for the two promised energy-generating reactors
|
| early Oct 2002 | James A. Kelly
Assistant Sec. of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs | - Flew to Pyongyang with a large entourage for a showdown over the uranium-enrichment program
- Kelly authorized to tell the Koreans that the U.S. had learned about the illicit uranium program
- No room for Kelly to negotiate.
- Scripted message:
- Written in the N.S.C."-the National Security Council-"by hard-liners.
- North Korea must stop the program before any negotiations could take place
- Former intelligence official: "When it came time to confront North Korea, we had no plan, no contact-nothing to negotiate with. ... but we let it all fall apart."
|
Kang Suk Ju
First Vice Foreign Minister of North Korea | - Seemed to confirm the charge when he responded by insisting upon his nation's right to develop nuclear weapons.
- Sccused the United States of "threatening North Korea's survival"
- Produced a list of the United States' alleged failures to meet its own obligations under the 1994 agreement
- Offered to shut down the enrichment program in return for:
- An American promise not to attack
- A commitment to normalize relations
|
| James A. Kelly | Constrained by his instructions, could only re-state his brief: the North Koreans must act first |
| 16 Oct 2002 | Bush admin. | Informs the public about North Korea situation, five days after Congress voted to authorize military force against Iraq |
| late 2002 | American policy | Alternated between tough talk in public-vows that the Administration wouldn't be "blackmailed," or even meet with North Korean leaders-and private efforts, through third parties, to open an indirect line of communication with Pyongyang |
| North Korea | - Expelled international inspectors
- Renounced the nonproliferation treaty
- Threatened to begin reprocessing spent nuclear fuel
- Insisted on direct talks with the Bush Administration
|
| 2003 | North Korea | Still unknown if it has begun to build warheads |
| early Jan 2003 | Bush | - Agreed to consider renewed American aid in return for a commitment by North Korea to abandon its nuclear program
- Still resisting direct negotiations with the Kim Jong Il government
|
